Private Cost Recovery Actions, Insurance Claims and the Missouri Underground Storage Tanks Fund by Korlin, Sheldon D.
Journal of Environmental and Sustainability Law 
Missouri Environmental Law and Policy Review 
Volume 2 
Issue 1 1993-1994 
Article 3 
1994 
Private Cost Recovery Actions, Insurance Claims and the Missouri 
Underground Storage Tanks Fund 
Sheldon D. Korlin 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jesl 
 Part of the Environmental Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Sheldon D. Korlin, Private Cost Recovery Actions, Insurance Claims and the Missouri Underground Storage 
Tanks Fund, 2 Mo. Envtl. L. & Pol'y Rev. 5 (1994) 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jesl/vol2/iss1/3 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at University of Missouri School of Law 
Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Environmental and Sustainability Law by an 




CLAIMS AND THE MISSOURI
UNDERGROUND STORAGE
TANKS FUND©
by Sheldon D. Korlin
It can be very costly to remediate petro-
leum contamination. Often, more than
one release event triggered the cleanup.
At some properties, there has been more
than one owner or operator of the under-
ground storage tanks ("USTs"). The ques-
tion for the UST owner or operator is how to
recover some or all of the money spent to
clean up the property.
I. PRIVATE Cosr REcovERv AcnoNs
Theenvironmentallawsgoveming these
types of claims are newwhen compared with
other laws. Broadly speaking, there are four
different types of claims: 1) Express Statu-
tory Claim for Contribution or Indemnity; 2)
Statutory Citizen Suits; 3) Implied Claims;
and 4) Common Law Claims. Determining
the proper parties and claims depend upon
the particular facts of that site.
A) Federal Causes of Action
1) CERCLA and The Petroleum Exclu-
sion. The Comprehensive Environmental
Response Compensation and Liability Act
("CERCLA"),2 expressly recognizes the right
of a private party to bring a cost recovery
action for contribution against another "po-
tentially responsible party" ("PRP").3 To
recover "response costs" from another PRP,
a private party must show they incurred
response costs because of a release or threat-
ened release of "hazardous substances" and
that the costs incurred were both necessary
and consistent with the National Contin-
gency Plan ("NCP").' The term "hazardous
substances" is defined in the statute and the
regulations.' Gasoline is produced from
individual chemicals which are listed as haz-
ardous substances in the regulations. But,
CERCLA's definition of "hazardous sub-
stance" contains a "petroleum exclusion."
The last sentence of the CERCLA "hazard-
ous substance" statutory definition states:
the term ["hazardous substance"]
does not include petroleum, in-
cluding crude oil or any fraction
thereof which is not otherwise
specifically listed or designated as
a hazardous substance under sub-
paragraphs (A) through (F) of this
paragraph..."
Federal courts have interpreted this to
mean that even waste oil cleanups are ex-
cluded unless it can be shown that the haz-
ardous substances found in the oil or con-
taminated soils exceed the levels at which the
substances might be mixed with oil during
the refining process.7 Two Eastern District
of Missouri cases indicated that when oil is
mixed with other hazardous substances (e.g.,
PCBs) the petroleum exclusion does not
apply and the mixture is to be treated as a
hazardous substance.' In Portsmouth
Redev. and Hous. Auth. v. BMI Apart-
ments Assocs.,9 the Court ruled, on a mo-
tion to dismiss, that CERCLA's petroleum
exclusion did not apply to a complaint seek-
ing cleanup of a site allegedly contaminated
with "petroleum hydrocarbons" where other
pleadings in the record asserted that con-
taminants at the site were not limited to
petroleum hydrocarbons and it could not be
determined whether petroleum hydrocar-
bons at the site were present at levels which
would bring them within the scope of the
exclusion.
The petroleum exclusion does not in-
clude petroleum with contaminants added to
the oil through use.'0 Courts will not enter-
tain any actions based solely upon the levels
of hazardous substances found in petroleum
products as a result of the ordinary refining
processes." But in Cose v. Getty Oil Co.,' 2
the Court found that crude oil tank bottoms
containing chrysene (a listed CERCLA haz-
ardous substance) are not petroleum and,
therefore, not within CERCLA's petroleum
exclusion even though Chrysene is indig-
enous to petroleum and present as a result of
the petroleum release. Relying on its prior
definition of "petroleum" in Wilshire
1 Copyright, 1994, Sheldon D. Korlin, Attorney at Law, St. Louis, Missouri.
2 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
3 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(a) (1988); 42 U.S.C. § 9613(1)(1) (1988).
4 42 U.S.C. § 9607(aX4)(B). See General Elec. v. Litton, 920 F.2d 1415, 1419-1420 (8th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 1390 (1991).
5 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14) and 40 C.F.R. § 302.4 (1993).
6 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14).
7 Bunger v. Hartman, 797 F.Supp. 968,971-972 (S.D. Fla. 1992); Mid Valley Bank v. North Valley Bank, 764 F.Supp. 1377, 1384, 1386-87 (E.D. Cal. 1991); Niecko
a. Emro Mktg. Co., 769 F.Supp. 973, 978 (E.D. Mich. 1991), aff'd, 973 F.2d 1296 (1992).
8 United States v. Mexico Feed and Seed Co., Inc., 729 F.Supp. 1250 (E.D. Mo. 1990); United States v. Bliss, 667 F.Supp. 1298 (E.D. Mo. 1987).
9 827 F.Supp. 354, 356 (E.D. Va. 1993).
10 United States v. Westem Processing Co., Inc., 761 F.Supp. 713 (W.D. Wash. 1991) (waste oil from rinsing and cleaning oil tanks that contains nickel and chromium oxides
In the tank's interior is not within the petroleum exclusion); and United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 755 F.Supp. 531, 539 (N.D. N.Y. 1991) (petroleum exclusion does not
cover contaminants added to oil through use).
11 City of New York v. Exxon Corp., 766 F.Supp. 177, 186 (S.D. N.Y. 1991); and Wilshire Westwood Assocs. v. Atlantic Richfield Corp., 881 F.2d 801 (9th Cir. 1989).
12 23 Enytl. L Rep. (Eny. L Inst.) 21335 (9th Cir. 1993). 5
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Westwood Associates,13 the Ninth Circuit
concluded that since tank bottoms settle out
of crude oil prior to the refining process they
are never subjected to the refining processes
as the petroleum definition requires.' 4 It also
found that tank bottoms are not used for
producing useful products and are simply
discarded.'s
2) Resource Conservation Recovery
Act. The Resource Conservation and Re-
covery Act ("RCRA")16 governs the storage,
treatment and disposal of solid and hazard-
ous wastes. RCRA contains a citizen's suit
provision which allows a private party to
maintain an injunctive action to compel an-
other person or entity to comply with the
requirements of RCRA and its regulations if
the regulatory agencies do not.17 The Stat-
ute requires 90 days written notice to EPA,
the State and the alleged violators prior to
filing suit.'8 The RCRA citizen suit provision
can be used against any past or present
generator, transporter, owner or operator
who contributed or is contributing to the past
or present handling, storage, treatment or
disposal or any solid or hazardous waste
which may present an imminent and sub-
stantial endangerment to health or the envi-
ronment.19 Under RCRA, oil, gasoline and
other petroleum products may be treated as
hazardous orsolid waste when they enter the
soil or groundwater because even virgin oil
or gasoline is incapable of being reused for
any useful purpose once it has mixed with
the soil or the groundwater.20 In Zands v.
Nelson,21 the Court held that leaked gaso-
line is no longer a useful product when mixed
with the soil and becomes solid waste for
purposes of a RCRA citizen's suit action.?
To prevail on a RCRA citizen's suit, a
claimant must show an imminent and sub-
stantial endangerment to public health or the
environment. CERCLA has an identical
provision under its abatement authority of
42 U.S.C. § 9606. Some courts have
construed these provisions more liberally
than public nuisances.? The endangerment
or potential endangerment does not have to
be an emergency situation.24 An endanger-
ment may be "imminent" without any actual
harm if the conditions giving rise to the
potential endangerment are present.? The
term "substantial endangerment" may not
require quantitative proof of actual harm.
According to one Missouri District Court,
"an endangerment is substantial if there is
reasonable cause for concern that someone
or something may be exposed to a risk of
harm by a release or threatened release of a
hazardous substance if a remedial action is
not taken, keeping in mind protection of the
public health, welfare and the environment is
of primary importance."a6 It may still be an
imminent and substantial endangerment even
if cleanup activities have begun.' A RCRA
citizen suit may not even be barred under 42
U.S.C. § 6972(b)(2)(B) or (C) where 1) the
cleanup efforts have begun and 2) the EPA
monitored replacement of a leaking pipeline
to ensure no further leakage occurred and
the state waived a water discharge require-
ment to help the responsible party facilitate
and expedite the cleanup.2s
RCRA's language does not prohibit the
assertion of damage claims. However, un-
der RCRA, the argument for existence of an
implied cause of action for private parties to
recover damages is undercut because if Con-
gress had intended such an action to exist, it
could have expressly included such a provi-
sion. At least one court has refused to allow
a private party action for recovery of legal
damages."
B) Missouri Statutory Claims
1) Missouri Hazardous Substance
Emergency Response Act ("HSERA" or
"Spill Bill"). The Missouri Hazardous Sub-
stance Emergency Response Act" is similar
to the federal CERCLA statute prior to the
1986 amendments. HSERA is written in the
present tense and does not address past
conduct or ownership. HSERA's definition
of "hazardous substance" is more inclusive
than CERCLA's definition. It includes "any
substance or mixture of substances that pre-
sents a danger to the public health or safety
or the environment.. ."a3 Missouri regula-
tions define waste oil as a hazardous sub-
13 881 F.2d 801 (9th Cir. 1989).
14 23 Envtl. L Rep. (Enytl. L Inst.) at 21337.
15 23 Envtl. L Rep. (Envtl. L Inst.) at 21337-21338. The U.S. v. Western Processing Co. case reached a similar conclusion, 761 F.Supp. at 721.
16 42 U.S.C. § 6901-6992k (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
17 42 U.S.C. § 6972.
18 42 U.S.C. § 6972(b).
19 42 U.S.C. § 6972(aX)(B).
20 42 U.S.C. § 9603 (definitions of "hazardous waste" and "recovered material").
21 779 F.Supp. 1254, 1262 (S.D. Cal. 1991).
22 Id.; See also Pantry Inc: v. Stop-N-Go Foods, Inc., 796 F.Supp. 1171 (S.D. Ind. 1992) (when petroleum leaked from USTs without a permit, the petroleum products wer
waste under Kentucky statute). Se alsoDominick's Finer Foods, Inc. v. Amoco Oil Co., 1993 WL524,808, No. 93C-4210 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 17, 1993) (gasoline, fuel oil and waste
oil leakage from USTs constitute disposal of solid waste for which a citizen suit may be brought under RCRA § 7002(aXl)(B).
23 Middlesex County Bd. of Chosen Freeholders v. New Jersey Dep't of Envll. Protection, 645 F.Supp. 715 (D. N.J. 1986).
24 United States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 619 F.Supp. 162, 193 (W.D. Mo. 1985); B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Murtha, 697 F.Supp. 89, 95 (D. Conn. 1988).
25 Conservation Chemical Company, 619 F.Supp. at 193; United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical and Chem. Co., 579 F.Supp. 823,846 (W.D. Mo. 1984).
26 Conservation Chemical Company, 619 F.Supp. at 194.
27 Paper Recycling Inc. u. Amoco Oil Co., No. 1:91-CV-3123-RHH slip op. (N.D. Ga. Aug. 23, 1993) (Not reported).
28 Paper Recycling Inc., supra note 27.
29 Walls v. Waste Resource Corp., 761 F.2d 311, 316 (6th Cir. 1985).
30 Mo. Rev. Stat, § 260.500-260.550 1983.
31 Mo. Rev. Stat § 260.500(5).
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stance.32 For purposes of HSERA, waste oil
is a hazardous substance. HSERA also
defines a "hazardous substance" to include
any release of petroleum, including crude oil
or any fraction of crude oil, in excess of fifty
gallons.?
HSERA applies to "any person [having
control over] a hazardous substance . . .
when a hazardous substance emergency
occurs."3* This means the owner of the
hazardous substance or anyone operating
under a lease, contract or "other agreement
with the legal owner thereof." HSERA does
not contain an express right for a private
party cause of action.
The pre-1986 CERCLA allowed for
strict liability to the government but did not
address whether PRPs were jointly and sev-
erally liable and did not expressly authorize a
private party cause of action. (Compare with
§ 260.530 RSMo.) Some early court deci-
sions under CERCLA found that joint and
several liability should be imposed where the
harm is indivisible." InCityof Philadelphia
v. Stepan Chem. Co., the District Court
permitted the City of Philadelphia to main-
tain an action to recover the City's cleanup
costs against entities which illegally dumped
hazardous industrial waste on the city prop-
erty.37 The Court relied on the lack of
prohibitive language and the language of §
9607(a)(4)(B) which permitted the recovery
of other necessary response costs incurred
"by any other person" and not just the
federal or state govemment."
HSERA lacks language similar to 42
U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B) of CERCLA but the
reasoning and logic to allow such private
party suits seems equally applicable to
HSERA. The lack of prohibitive language
concerning private party actions also applies
to HSERA. There is no reported decision on
the issue of whether an action for contribu-
tion is implied in the terms of HSERA. .
2) Contribution. The Missouri Contri-
bution Statute provides for contribution be-
tween joint tortfeasors.39 Where the Mis-
souri Department of Natural Resources
("DNR") could potentially hold a private
owner liable for petroleum contamination
but only obtained a judgment against the
currentowneroroperator, thecurrentowner
or operator should consider whether the
contribution statute might apply. Illinois
courts have upheld the use of Illinois' contri-
bution statute as a basis for seeking contribu-
tion for cleanup costs."
3) Waste. "Waste" is lasting damage
to a reversionary interest in property for the
destruction of land by a tenant for life or
years.41 The common law waste action is
codified at §§ 537.420 to 537.510 RSMo.
The Missouri statute provides that anytenant
for life or years who commits waste will lose
the thing wasted and pay treble damages.42
Under the statute, a month-to-month
tenant is not liable. But under the common
law every tenant is liable forvoluntarywaste43
Voluntary waste is different from permissive
waste because it consists of some action by
a tenant which directly damages the prop-
erty." It is unclear whether the Missouri
statuteabolishedthedistinctionbuttheLustig
court stated that it found no reason in either
the law or public policy to impose it.45
C) Common Law Claims
1) Strict Liability. A person may be
strictly liable for damages when the damages
arise out of some activity which is unduly
dangerous and inappropriate to the place
maintained in light of the surrounding cir-
cumstances."6 Current owners have used
this theory against prior owners who have
abandoned hazardous materials on a theory
that the disposal of hazardous waste is an
ultrahazardous activity for which the dispos-
ers should beheld strictly lable.47 Also, some
courts have ruled that the storage of gasoline
in residential neighborhoods is an
ultrahazardous activity justifying the imposi-
tion of strict liability for the tank's cleanup.e
2) Public Nuisance. Publicnuisanceis
an unreasonable interference with the com-
mon community rights such as the public
health, safety, peace, morals or conve-
nience.49 Normally, a public nuisance is
brought by an attorney general or prosecut-
ing attorney. A private party may recover for
public nuisance where the private party suf-
fers some special or peculiar damage differ-
ing in kind, and not merely in degree, from
32 Mo. CODE REGs. tit. 10, § 25-11.010 (1993).
33 Mo. Rev. Stat. § 260.500(6)(b).
34 Mo. Rev. Stat § 260.500(8).
35 See e.g. United States v. Chem-Dyne, 572 F.Supp. 802, 811 (S.D. Ohio 1983); United States v. Wade, 577 F.Supp. 1326, 1337-38 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
36 544 F.Supp. 1135, 12 Envtl. L Rep. (Envtl. L Inst.) 20915, 20917 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
37 City of Philadelphia, 12 Envil. L Rep. at 20916, 20917.
38 Id.at20917.
39 Section 537.060, RSMo 1988.
40 People v. Brockman, 550 N.E. 2d 222 (I. 1990).
41 Profitt v. Henderson, 29 Mo. 325 (1860).
42 Section 537.420, RSMo 1986.
43 Boefer v. Sheridan, 42 Mo. CL App. 226 (1890).
44 Lustig v. U.M.C. Indus., Inc., 637 S.W.2d 55, 59 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982).
45 Lustig, 637 S.W.2d at 60.
46 Bennettv. Mallinckrodt Inc., 698 S.W.2d 854,868-869 (Mo.App. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1176 (1986). CompareDominick's Finer Foods, Inc. v. Amoco Oil Co.,
1993 WL 524,808, No. 93C-4210 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 17, 1993) (Operating a gas station and bulk petroleum storage facility in a commercial area is not an abnormally dangerous
activity and does not trigger strict liability under Illinois law).
47 Jersey City Redev. Auth. v. PPG Indus., Inc., 866 F.2d 1411 (not published), 17 Cte. Ur. REP. 626 (3rd Cir. 1988).
48 Yommer v. McKenzie, 257 A.2d 138 (Md. 1969); Siegler v. Kuhlman, 502 P.2d 1181 (Wash. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 983 (1973); City of Northglenn, Colo. v.
Chevron U.SA, Inc., 519 F.Supp. 515, 516 (D. Colo. 1981).
49 City of Lee's Summit v. Browning, 722 S.W.2d 114, 115 (Mo. CL App. 1986).
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the general injury to the public.so A party
may recover compensatory damages and
punitive damages if a nuisance is knowingly
and willfully maintained.s' The measure of
damages is the diminution and value of
property for damage caused by the public
nuisance.
3) Private Nuisance. Privatenuisance
is the unreasonable, unusual or unnatural
use of one's property such that it substan-
tially impairs the right of another to the
peaceful and quiet enjoyment of their prop-
erty.Y Whether a particular use is an unrea-
sonable invasion of another's use and enjoy-
ment must be determined from the facts in
each case.0 The damages in a nuisance
action depend upon whether the nuisance is
deemed temporary or permanent. The char-
acter of the injury source, not the character
of the injury itself, determines whether a
nuisance is temporary or permanent.-4 A
nuisance is temporary if it can be abated, and
permanent if abatement is impractical or
impossible." Damages for permanent nui-
sance are measured by the difference in the
land's market value immediately before and
after the injury." Damages for a temporary
nuisance include the decrease in rental or
usable value of the property during the in-
jury. 7 Properly pleaded special damages
may be recoverable in a nuisance action."s
Punitive damages may be recoverable if the
nuisance is knowingly or willfully maintained.
4) Trespass. Trespass is a direct
physical interference with the property of
another.59 Trespass actions are closely re-
lated to nuisance actions. The distinction is
that a trespass involves a physical invasion
onto the landowner's property.60 A tres-
passer is liable for damages caused by the
trespass regardless of whether the trespasser
acted in good faith with reasonable care,
acted in ignorance of the landowner's rights
or acted under a misstatement of law or
fact.6 ' Damages are measured as the cost of
restoration of the property."
To recover, as in negligence, a plaintiff
must show that an adjacent property owner
or prior occupant 1) had a duty to protect the
plaintiff from injury; 2) failed to perform that
duty; and 3) that an injury to the plaintiff
resulted from the failure.63 The duty of care
arises when there is a foreseeable likelihood
that the particular acts or omissions will
cause the injury." The duty of care can also
be shown by the existence of a statutory law
or the existence of a duty at common law."
5) Breach of Warranty, Contract or
Lease. Under this theory, the purchase
agreement, deed, orwritten leases should be
reviewed to determine if there is a potential
breach of the obligations of the contract or
warranties and covenants made in the agree-
ment. These types of claims might be
brought against prior owners or current or
prior tenants.
6) Fraud and Misrepresentation. This
type of claim might be brought by a current
owner against a former owner alleging a
misrepresentation as to the condition of the
property. This may take the form of an
allegation of fraudulent concealment." To
prove fraudulent concealment, the current
owner must demonstrate 1) deliberate con-
cealment or nondisclosure by the seller, 2) of
a material fact or defect which was not
readily observable to the purchaser, and 3)
that the buyer relied upon the seller to his
detriment.67 In Missouri, silence can be an
act of fraud where matters are not as they
appear and a true state of affairs is not
discoverable by ordinary diligence.68
II. INSURANCE CLANS
A) Private Insurance These claims usually
arise under comprehensive general liability
insurance policies ("CGLs") or, more re-
cently, under environmental impairment li-
ability policies ("EILs"). The policy terms of
CGLs and EILs are generally standardized
across the companies which insure such
risks through use of ISO policy forms.
Some of the key provisions in policies
issued by the private insurance companies
include the coverage description, the exclu-
sions to coverage from environmental re-
50 Grommet v. St. Louis County, 680 S.W.2d 246, 251-252 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984).
51 Maryland Heights Leasing, Inc. v. Mallinckrodt Inc., 706 S.W.2d 218, 222 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985).
52 Davis v. J.C. Nichols Co., 714 S.W.2d 679,684 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986).
53 Racine v. Glendale Shooting Club, Inc., 755 S.W.2d 369,372 (Mo. Ct App. 1988); Chaveriat v. Williams Pipeline Co., 11 F.3d 1420,24 Envl. L Rep. (Envtl. L Inst.)
20217 (7th Cir. 1993) (Prior owner of a petroleum carrying pipeline is not liable for nuisance damages from a 1944 leak of unleaded gasoline under the plaintiffs land).
54 Racine, 755 S.W.2d at 374.
55 Maryland Heights Leasing, Inc., 706 S.W.2d at 222.
56 Frank v. Environmental Sanitation Mgmnt, Inc., 687 S.W.2d 876, 883 (Mo. 1985).
57 Id.
58 Maryland Heights Leasing, 706 S.W.2d at 222.
59 Looney v. Hindman, 649 S.W.2d 207, 212 (Mo. 1983).
60 Maryland Heights Leasing, 706 S.W.2d at 226.
61 Crook v. Sheehan Enters., Inc., 740 S.W.2d 333, 336 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987).
62 Id.
63 Maryland Heights Leasing, 706 S.W.2d at 223.
64 Id.
65 Maryland Heights Leasing, 706 S.W.2d 218.
66 See Niecko v. Emro Mktg Co., 973 F.2d 1296, 1302 (6th Cir. 1992). See also Braswell Shipyards, Inc. v. Beazer East, Inc., 2 F.3d 1331, 24 Envtl. L Rep. (Envl. L
Inst.) 20,132 (4th Cir. 1993) (negligent nondisclosure claim under South Carolina law).
67 Niecko, 973 F.2d at 1302.
68 Bayne u. Jenkins, 593 S.W.2d 519,529 (Mo. 1980).
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lease occurrences, and the qualified exclu-
sions for damage to property owned, occu-
pled by or rented to the insured. Also, the
definitions of "occurrence" and "property
damage" can become important in an insur-
ance coverage dispute. The qualified envi-
ronmental release exclusion was rewritten to
delete coverage of "sudden and accidental"
release events. This absolute exclusion is
now contained in nearly all CGL and EIL
policies since approximately 1986. Early
policies were written on an "occurrence"
basis. More recent policies are written on a
"claims-made" basis which generally require
the claim to be made during the policy period
and a short grace period.
B) Missouri UST Insurance Fund
In 1989 Missouri created the "Under-
ground StorageTankInsuranceFund"("UST
Insurance Fund") within the State Trea-
sury.69 The UST Insurance Fund is adminis-
tered by the Director of the Department of
Natural Resources.o The Missouri UST
Insurance Fund is issued and written on a
claims-made basis.71 Its coverage applies to
bodily injury, "property damage," or "envi-
ronmental damage" caused by a "pollution
incident" that commenced after the stated
date of coverage in the policy. Because of its
purpose, the "pollution incident" must arise
from a leaking petroleum UST or its con-
nected piping or from a surface spill, overfill
or release. Applications to participate in the
insurance fund were not accepted until late
spring and early summer of 1992 and the
first tanks were not accepted until approxi-
mately the fall of 1992.
For an pre-existing tank to be eligible to
participate in the UST Insurance Fund, the
owner/operator had to pay their $100 per
tank registration fee prior to December 31,
1989. The owner/operator of tanks coming
into existence after August of 1989 had to
pay their $100 fee within thirty days of
coming into use. The actual insurance pre-
mium is based upon the use, age and condi-
tion of the tanks.72
In addition to premiums, there is an
annual participation fee ranging between
$100 and $200.73 The fee varies based
upon the type of construction and the extent
to which existing tanks and new tanks meet
upgrading and new construction require-
ments. An application is required for each
facility wishing to participate in the UST
Fund.74 To participate, the applicant must
demonstrate that they meet the financial
responsibility requirements of 10 C.S.R. §
20-11.090to20-11.O94forthefirst$25,000
in cleanup costs, compliance with the tech-
nical performance standards; and proof of
the integrity (lack of leaking) of the tanks to
be participating in the fund. The DNR
reviews the applications for completeness
and accuracy within thirty days. It must
notify the applicant of the status of its appli-
cation within thirty days of receipt 76 They
must respond in writing to all the applica-
tions." There is no time limit provided for
final review and decision of the insurance
application. Proof of integrity can be pro-
vided by a number of methods listed in 10
C.S.R. § 20-12.050.
The insurance fund provides coverage
of $1,000,000 per occurrence or
$2,000,000 aggregate per year.78 The in-
surance fund does not pay until after the
payment of the first $25,000 by the tank
owner or operator. The fund also provides
coverage for third-party claims for bodily
injury or property damage caused by leaking
USTs. Coverage for third-party bodily injury
is $100,000.00 per occurrence. The UST
Insurance Fund compensates for property
damage only to the extent required to con-
tain and clean up a release. It does not
compensate for intangible losses including
interruption of business, pain and suffering,
lost income, mental distress or punitive dam-
ages.79
The claims procedure is set out in 10
C.S.R. § 20-12.060 to 20-12.062. Claims
are subject to the availability of funds, limited
by the coverage limits and the availability of
money in the UST Insurance Fund. Cleanup
costs are given priority over third-party dam-
age claims.* Cleanup costs must be deter-
mined by the lowest responsive written bid
and approved by the Department prior to
the contract award.s"
In order to obtain coverage the Depart-
ment must be notified of the release within
twenty-four hours of the time of discovery
and the claimant must demonstrate that the
incident responsewas properly carried out in
an orderly fashion. This includes initial con-
trol of the release, subsequent investigation
of the extent and magnitude of the release
and development and implementation of an
appropriate and cost effective corrective
action plan. Eligible costs are listed in the
regulation, and include the costs of excava-
tion, transportation, treatment and disposal
of contaminated soils; costs associated with
implementation of an approved corrective
action plan; cost of sample collection, pres-
ervation, transportation and analysis; cost of
69 Mo. Rev. Stat. § 319.129, Supp. 1993. For more information, contact the Missouri Underground Storage Tank Insurance Fund at (712) 252-5137.
70 Mo. Rev. Stat. § 319.129.4, Supp. 1993. Note that emergency and final rules to implement the operation of the insurance fund were not effective until April and May
of 1992.
71 See Mo. Rev. Stat. § 319.129 Supp. 1993.
72 See Mo. CODE RES. fiL 10, § 20-12.010- (1993).
73 Mo. CoDE REGs. fit. 10, § 10-12.030 (1993).
74 Mo. CoDE REGs. it. 10, § 20-12.040(5) (1993).
75 Mo. CoDE REs. t. 10, § 20-12.040(2x4) (1993).
76 Mo. CoDE REGs. tit. 10, § 20-12.045(4) (1993).
77 Mo. CODE REas. tit 10, § 20-12.045(2) (1993).
78 Mo. Rev. Stat. 319.131.4 Supp. 1993.
79 Mo. Rev. Stat § 319.131.5 Supp. 1993.
80 Mo. Coos REOs. tit. 10, § 20-12.060(1XCX3) (1993).
81 Mo. CoDE REGs. tit 10, § 20-12.060(3)(B) (1993).
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site investigation and corrective action per-
formed in accordance with the UST site
investigation and corrective action regula-
tions and the DNR guidance documents, and
cost of professional services required for
proper performance of the investigation
corrective action plan and properly invoiced."
The UST Insurance Fund will also pay for
restoring off-site impacts from the release or
cleanup to the extent necessary83 The UST
Insurance Fund does not pay for the costs of
excavating, cleaning, disposing or transport-
ing leaking USTs nor for the cost for excavat-
ing, transporting, treating nor disposing of
uncontaminated soils except for the amount
of soils necessary to expose the contamina-
tion.
Though not provided for in the statute
or regulations, the policies issued by the
Missouri UST Fund set a retroactive date in
1992 starting with the day the facility was
accepted into the Insurance Fund. This
practice may conflict with the implication of
§ 319.129.2 RSMo, which inferred that
costs for responding to leaking USTs which
were registered and paid their participation
fee after August 28, 1989 would be cov-
ered by the UST Insurance Funds.
The Missouri UST Insurance Fund is a
"claims made" insurance policy requiring
that claims be entered within six months of
the termination coverage period. The policy
also requires approval by the DNR or its
representatives before cleanup costs can be
incurred which obligate the UST Insurance
Fund. Unlike some of the private insurance
companies, the Missouri UST Insurance Fund
does allow payment of cleanup costs for
environmental damage required under statu-
tory authority governed by the United States,
State of Missouri, or it's political subdivi-
sions. Many private insurance companies
require an actual civil suit, and in some cases
a judgment, before they will agree that cov-
erage for cleanup damages properly lies.
The State of Missouri has no obliga-
tions under the Insurance Fund. It is sepa-
rately operated from the State Funds.
1W1. COVERAGE ISSUES
A) Has an "occurrence" taken place?
Post-1973 policies define "occurrence" as
"an accident, including continuous or re-
peated exposure to conditions which results
in bodily injury or property damage neither
expected nor intended from the standpoint
of the insured." The litigation of this provi-
sion has focused on the "neither expected
nor intended" clause. Insurers take the
position that a series of events of the same
nature (e.g., leaks or spills) makes the result-
ing injury or damage "expected or intended"
by the insured so that the insurance com-
pany has no duty to defend or indemnify
under its policy.
Courts differ on their interpretation of
this standard. Some have used an objective
"knew or should have known" standard to
hold that there is no coverage when the
insured knew or should have known that its
behavior was causing or would have caused
environmental damage." Other courts use
a "substantial probability" test which re-
quires the insurance carrier to show facts
indicating a substantial probability or sub-
stantial certainty by the insured that off-site
pollution would occur as a result of the
insured's actions.85 Other courts have held
that even intentional acts by the insured may
be covered if the insured did not intend the
resulting damage."
Policyholders which have taken some
action to prevent the eventual environmental
damage may be able to successfully preserve
their coverage in response to a "neither
expected nor intended" defense raised by
the insurance carrier? An insured which
has maintained conditions at its business
which it knew was or was likely to be causing
bodily injury or property damage to its neigh-
boring landowners or its employees is least
likely to prevail when a "neither expected
nor intended" defense is raised."
B) When Is Coverage Triggered?
Because CGL and EIL policies provide
coverage for bodily injury or property dam-
age that "occur" during the policy period, the
issue is what event or events must take place
during the policy period in order to obligate
the insurance carrier to defend and indem-
nify the policyholder on a claim. In pollution
coverage cases, including leaking UST cases,
this is difficult to determine because if a leak
commenced and continued over time, the
effects of the leak and, therefore, the leak
itself may not be discovered for many years.
The facts alleged or proven in these claims
are critical with respect to determining the
insurance coverage issues.
Courts have developed at least four
different explanations of when damage oc-
curs for purposes of triggering insurance
coverage. The first explanation is a "con-
tinuous trigger" approach. It first arose in
litigation concerning latent injuries from as-
bestos exposure in Keene Corp. u. Insur-
ance Co. of N. Am.,"9 where the Court held
82 Mo. CoDE REs. tit 10, § 20-12.061(7A)(E) (1993).
83 Mo. CODE REGs. it. 10,.§ 20-12.061(7(F) (1993).
84 Summit Assocs., Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 550 A.2d 1235,1239 (N.J. Super. 1988); and Riehi v. Travelers Ins. Co., 772 F.2d 19,24 (3rd Cir. 1985) (applying
Pennsylvania Law).
85 New Castle County v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 685 F.Supp. 1321 (D. Del. 1988) (applying Delaware law); United States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 653 F.Supp.
152 (W.D. Mo. 1986) (applying Missouri law); and County of Broome v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 540 N.Y.S.2d 620 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989).
86 Johnstown v. Bankers Standard Ins. Co., 877 F.2d 1146 (2d Cir. 1989) (applying New York law); Aetna Cas. & Surety Co. v. General Dynamics Corp., 783 F.Supp. 1199
(E.D. Mo. 1991); Peppers Steel & Alloys, Inc. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 668 F.Supp. 1541 (S.D. Fla. 1987) (applying Florida law); Hecla Mining Co. v. New Hampshire
Ins. Co., 811 P.2d 1083 (Colo. 1991).
87 New Castle County v. Hartford Accident and Indem. Co., 685 F.Supp. 1321 (D. Del. 1988); and United States Fidelity& Guar. Co. v. Thomas Solvents Co., 683 F.Supp.
1139 (W.D. Mich. 1988) (applying Michigan law).
88 American Motorists Ins. Co. v. General Host Co., 946 F.2d 1482 (10th Cir. 1991).
89 667 F.2d 1034 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. denied 455 U.S. 1007 (1982).
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that all policies from the first exposure until
manifestation of the injury were jointly and
severally obligated to provide coverage." It
was also adopted in theAsbestos Insurance
Couerage Cases.91 Recently other courts
adopted this approach in environmental
claims cases where the damage is allegedly
caused by continuous and progressive expo-
sure to hazardous materials." Policyholders
favor a continuous trigger theory as it maxi-
mizes potential insurance coverage.
Insurers favor a "manifestation" or "dis-
covery" explanation of when coverage is
triggered because it tends to minimize avail-
able insurance coverage. Under this expla-
nation, no coverage is obligated until the
damage is discovered or manifests itself. It is
used in some first party property damage
claims but has not been applied very often in
third party claim situations because of diffi-
culty in deciding what constitutes "manifes-
tation" of the injury."
A third explanation provides that cov-
erage under a liability insurance policy is
triggered at the point in time when the
environment was exposed to the damaging
pollution."
A fourth explanation requires a factual
showing, usually by the insured, that the
property damage occurred during the rel-
evant policy period.95 Under the "injury in
fact" theory each policy during which the
injury actually occurred may be triggered to
provide coverage.
C) Qualified Pollution Exclusion
Commencing in the 1970's, most CGL
policies added a qualified pollution exclusion
provision that provides:
This policy does not apply to
bodily injury or property damage
arising out of the discharge dis-
persal, release or escape of smoke
vapors, soot, fumes, acids,
alkalines, toxic chemicals, liquids
or gases, waste materials or other
irritants, contaminants or pollut-
ants into or upon the land, the
atmosphere or any water cause
or body of water but this exclu-
sion does not apply if such dis-
charge dispersal, release or es-
cape is sudden and accidental.
The debate over this clause is whether
"sudden and accidental" is a restatement of
the definition of "occurrence" or whether it
is descriptive of the potentially triggering
event in terms of time and how the event
happened. One court held that the fact that
different courts have reached different inter-
pretations of the pollution exclusion clause
meant that the exclusion was ambiguous as
a matter of law."
Some courts believe that because "sud-
den" is capable of more than one meaning it
is ambiguous andshould be construed against
the insurance carriers and in favor of cover-
age." Some courts which ruled that the
pollution exclusion is ambiguous relied on
the drafting history of the provision con-
tained in materials authored by the insurance
industry which indicate that the qualified
pollution exclusion clause was intended as a
clarification of the "occurrence" definition.' 8
Other courts have ruled in favor of the
insurance carriers and against coverage on
the "sudden and accidental" issue. Gener-
ally, these courts conclude that the plain
meaning of "sudden" should apply and there-
fore exclude coverage of any pollution which
occurred over time as inconsistent with the
exclusion." Other cases upholding the ex-
clusion focus on the nature of the polluting
acts. These courts have upheld the exclusion
when the disposal or pollution arises as part
of the insured's regular business activity and,
therefore, the pollution is not "accidental".'"
In recent years, CGL and EIL policies
modified this exclusion and replaced it with
the absolute exclusion. This modified exclu-
sion drops the "sudden and accidental" clause
and adds exclusionary language for costs for
cleanup, investigation, detoxification, moni-
toring and other similar costs. So far, most
courts considering this provision have up-
held it as clear and unambiguous.'or How-
ever, a few courts have either found the
90 Keene Corp., 667 F.2d at 1045-1046.
91 JUDICIAL COUNCL COORDINATION PiOEING No. 1072, CAuroaNIA SuPmoRI Coulrr, SAN FRANsco CouN7Y, JuDNre AND STATmENT OF REASONS FOR DECIsIoNs (All Phases)
(Jan. 29, 1990) reported in MEAW'S LITIGATION REoRTs - INSURANCE (Feb. 27, 1990 Supp.).
92 BroderickInv. Co. v.HartfordAcc.&Indem. Co., 742 F.Supp. 571 (D. Colo. 1989); NewCastleCountyv. Continental Cas. Co., 725 F.Supp. 800(D. Del. 1989). Compare
also Montrose Chem. Corp. v. Canadian Universal Ins. Co., No. S024390 (Cal. Nov. 22, 1993).
93 Maryland Cas. Co. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 794 F.Supp. 1206 (S.D. N.Y. 1991); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Quinn Constr. Co., 713 F.Supp. 35 (D. Mass. 1989).
94 Continental Ins. Cos. v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 842 F.2d 977 (8th Cir. 1988); MAPCO Alaska Petroleum Inc. v. Central Nat'I Ins. Co. of Omaha,
784 F.Supp. 1454 (D. Ala. 1991); and Fireman's Fund Ins. Cos. v. Ex-Cell-O Corp., 662 F.Supp. 71 (ED. Mich. 1987).
95 United Statesv. Conservation Chem. Co., 653 F.Supp. 152 (W.D. Mo. 1986); Triangle Publication Incv. LibertyMut Ins. Co., 703 F.Supp. 376 (E.D. Pa. 1989); Centennial
Ins. Co. v. Lumbermens Mut Cas. Co., 677 F.Supp. 342 (ED. Pa. 1987).
96 Smith v. Hughes Aircraft Co. Corp., 783 F.Supp. 1222 (D. Ariz. 1991).
97 New Castle County v. Hartford Acc. and Indem. Co., 933 F.2d 1162 (3rd Cir. 1991) (applying Delaware law); Claussen v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 380 S.E.2d 686 (Ga.
1989); Hecla Mining Co. v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 811 P.2d 1083 (Colo. 1991).
98 Queen CIty Farms, Inc. v. Central Nat'l Ins. Co. of Omaha, 827 P.2d 1024,1049 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992); United States Fidelity& Guar. Co. v. Special Coatings Co., 535
N.E.2d 1071, 1077-78 (III. App. Ct. 1989); Broadwell Realty Services, Inc. v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 528 A.2d 76, 85 (N.J. Super. Ct App. Div. 1987).
99 Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. General Dynamics Corp., 968 F.2d 707, 710 (8th Cir. 1992); Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co. v. Belleville Indus., Inc., 938 F.2d 1423, 1425 (1st
Cir. 1991) reh'g. denied, cert. denied 112 S.Ct. 969 (1992); Northern Ins. Co. v. Aardvark Ass'n, Inc., 942 F.2d 189, 192 (3rd Cir. 1991); Armotek lhdus. Inc. v. Employers
Ins. of Wausau, 952 F.2d 756, 762 (3rd Or. 1991) (meaning single abrupt event lasting only a short time).
100 Bureau of Engraving, Inc. v. Federal Ins. Co., 5 F.3d 1175,1177 (8th Cir. 1993) (applying Minnesota law); Broderick Inv. Co. v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 954 F.2d
601, 604-5 (10th Or. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 189 (1992); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Triangle Indus. Inc., 957 F.2d 1153, 1157 (4th Or. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct.
78 (1992) ("sudden and accidental" applies to discharge, not the damage); American Motorists Ins. Co. v. General Host Corp., 946 F.2d 1489, 1490 (10th Or. 1991).
101 Pipefitters Welfare Educ. Fund v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 976 F.2d 1037, 1040 (7th Cir. 1992); Park-Ohio Indus., Inc. v. Home Indem. Co., 975 F.2d 1215 (6th Cir.1992). 1 1
Vol. 2 * No. 1
"absolute exclusion" ambiguous and found
in favor of coverage or found that a particular
substance which caused the damage is not a
"pollutant" as the term is defined in the
policy.102
D) The Owned, Rented, or Occupied
Property Exclusion
Many policies contain an exclusion pro-
viding as follows: "This policy does not apply
to...property damage to 1) property owned
or occupied by or rented to the insured, 2)
property used by the insured, or 3) property
in the care, custody, or control of the insured
or as to which the insured is for any purpose
exercising physical control."
Some courts have limited the applica-
bility of the exclusion in hazardous waste
litigation." 3 Other courts refuse to apply the
owned property exclusion when groundwa-
ter is contaminated because groundwater is
not owned by the surface landowner."
Some courts have upheld the owned prop-
erty exclusion where the waste contamina-
tion is confined to soils on the insured's own
property."es One court has held that the
term "water course or body of water" within
the meaning of the exclusionary language in
oil industry limitation endorsement to CGL
policy includes groundwater.'0 In charac-
terizing cleanup costs as legal or equitable
damages, several courts have interpreted the
term "damages" under Missouri law.107
IV. CONCLUSION
While much depends upon individual
factual circumstances, underground storage
tank owners and operators may be able to
recover some or all of the costs of corrective
action at petroleum contaminated proper-
ties. CERCLA provides an express right of
contribution. However, the "petroleum ex-
clusion" in the CERCLA definition of hazard-
ous substances may bar a private CERCLA
cost recovery unless the leaked gasoline
mixed with other hazardous substances.
A few courts have decided that petro-
leum and oil products are RCRA solid waste
when mixed with soil. This means that some
relief may be obtained under RCRA's citizen
suit provisions. One hurdle is to fashion an
acceptable remedy. At least one federal
court declared that monetary damages are
not available in a RCRA citizen suit. This
means early notice to PRP's and providing
them with an opportunity to participate in
the corrective action process is important to
obtaining a possible mandatory injunctive
orders and other nonmonetary relief.
As occurred with the original CERCLA
statute, an implied right to contribution may
be found in the Missouri Hazardous Sub-
stance Emergency Response Act. Oil and
gas would be a hazardous substance which
may present a danger to the public health or
environment. There is no reported decision
where a Missouri Circuit or Appellate Court
has either considered or decided this issue.
Other claims may exist under Missouri's
contribution and waste statutes. Also differ-
ent common law tort actions may exist to
recover clean up costs for petroleum con-
taminated sites. Such tort action could
vary based on the particular facts. Strict
liability, nuisance and trespass claims have
been pursued in other states.
Cost recovery efforts should pursue
potential insurance coverage under compre-
hensive general liability or environmental
impairment liability insurance policies. In-
surance carriers strongly contest virtually
every claim. Several major issues arise in
pursuing these claims including disputes over
when the triggering event or "occurrence"
happened and whether such event was "sud-
den and accidental." Several other coverage
and policy issues arise in these claims.
The uncertainty and highly contested
nature of petroleum cost recovery efforts
should be expected given the relative new-
ness of the environmental laws. Some cases
are worth greater effort and risk to affect a
recovery than others. Each case should be
evaluated and pursued based upon its indi-
vidual facts and relative value to the potential
plaintiff.
102 Westchester Fire Ins. Co. v. City of Pittsburgh, Kansas, 768 F.Supp. 1463 (D. Kan. 1991); Titan Holdings Syndicate, Inc. v. City of Keene, N.H., 898 F.2d 265, 268-
69 (1st Cir. 1990).103Township of Glouser v. Maryland Cas. Co., 668 F.Supp. 394 (D. N.J. 1987); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Quinn Constr. Co., 713 F.Supp. 35 (D. Mass. 1989)
and Bradwell Realty Servs., Inc. v. Fidelity & Cas. Co. of N.Y., 528 A.2d 76 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1987).
104 United States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 653 F.Supp. 152, 199-201 (W.D. Mo. 1986); Intel Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 952 F.2d 1551 (9th Or. 1991);
and Gerrish Corp. v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 997 F.2d 1023 (2d Cir. 1991).
105 Western World Ins. Co. v. Dana, 765 F.Supp. 1011 (ED. Cal. 1991).
106 MAPCO Alaska Petroleum, Inc. v. Central Nat'l Ins. Co. of Omaha, 784 F.Supp. 1454 (D. Ala. 1991).
107 Continental Ins. Co. v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical and Chem. Co. Inc., 842 F.2d 977 (8th Cir. 1988) (en banc)cert denied 488 U.S. 821 (1988) (applying Missouri
law) (cleanup costs are "equitable damages and therefore not covered by CGL policy); Parker Solvents Co., Inc. v. Royal Ins. Cos. of Am., 950 F.2d 57a (8th Or. 1991) ("damages"
does not include cleanup costs incurred as result of consent decree with EPA); Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. General Dynamics Corp., 968 F.2d 707, 712 (8th Cir. 1992); and
Independent Petrochemical Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 944 F.2d 940 (D.C. Or. 1991) (applying Missouri law) (upholds term "damages" as including cleanup costs because
term is not defined by policy and common understanding would include such costs); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. Inc. v. Pintlar Corp., 948 F.2d 1507 (9th Cir. 1991) ("damages" in
CGL is unambiguous and includes CERCLA response costs) (applying Idaho law); Gerrish Corp. v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 947 F.2d 1023 (2d Or. 1991) (response costs
for cleanup of gasoline leak constituted "damages" under CGL policy).
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